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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DANIEL LORENZO BONILLA. Safety climate and after action reviews in the fire 
service. (Under the direction of DR. CLIFTON SCOTT) 
 
 Research on safety climate has focused on supervisor attitudes and their 
relationship to the attitudes of their direct reports. This study examined the relationship of 
supervisor behaviors on direct report attitudes that in turn affect group level safety 
climate among firefighters. This study aggregated perceptions of supervisor trust, leader-
member exchange, behavioral integrity, supervisor after action review behavior, and 
safety climate to the group level to examine the relationship between supervisor 
behaviors, direct report attitudes and group safety climate. This study found that 
supervisor trust, behavioral integrity, and supervisor after action review behaviors have a 
strong positive relationship to safety climate. Further, perceptions of trust partially 
mediate the relationship between supervisor after action review behaviors and group level 
safety climate. Future research ideas, theoretical advancements, and practical applications 
are discussed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
 The costs of workplace injury and death are incredibly high. There were over 3.2 
million nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses in the private sector in 2009(US 
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics). In the same year there were 4,340 
fatalities across all private sectors. This statistic has held steady between 3,500 and 5,000 
deaths per year over the past ten years according to data recorded by the US Department 
of Labor.  
 These data, however, are not the entire story. According to Brown (2011) the 
Department of Labor, as part of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), only 
records private sector injury data. There are roughly 19 million government employees 
who are not included in the above statistics. Brown (2011) reported that these employees 
actually had a higher rate of injury than private sector employees in 2008. For example, 
firefighters had the highest rate of nonfatal injury in 2008 at 14.8 injuries per 100 
employees. In that same year the entire public sector experienced 6.3 nonfatal injuries per 
100 employees. Both are higher than the private sector in 2008. 
 Leigh, Markowitz, Fahs, & Landrigan (2000) attempted to calculate the direct and 
indirect cost of workplace injury and death in 1992. Using statistics from the Department 
of Labor, the National Health Interview Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Census of 
Fatal Occupational Injuries, and other sources the researchers estimate that there were 
6,371 fatal workplace injuries in 1992 and over 13 million nonfatal injuries. 
 Leigh, et al. (2000) estimated $155.5 billion in direct and indirect costs to 
employees, employers, and taxpayers in 1992 due to workplace injury, assault, and death 
across private and public sectors. In short, the costs of workplace injury, direct and 
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indirect, financial and physical, are enormous. Leigh, et al. (2000) estimated that most 
Americans between the ages of 22 and 65 spend nearly half of their waking hours at 
work. The risk here is quite large.  Statistically speaking, the workplace is much more 
dangerous than the average household and the costs associated with workplace injury and 
death are higher than that of AIDS, arthritis, or Alzheimer’s disease on a national level 
(Leigh, et al., 2000). 
 Considering these incredible costs, workplace safety should be at the top of most 
executive’s agendas when examining organizational risk. In many cases it is. In 
accordance with OSHA, employers and employees must comply with a variety of safety 
regulations or face stiff penalties and fines. Brown (2011) found that organizations with 
an explicit safety program in 2008 experienced a lower rate of employee injury than 
organizations lacking such a program. Focusing on safety is a wise risk management 
decision on an organizational level. It is also a wise ethical decision. Communities and 
individual lives are at risk when organizations do not prize safety. Risk management is 
something organizations ought to do.  
 A variety of approaches have been taken to address organizational safety. 
Mandating OSHA compliance (Brown, 2011), linking safety performance to pay 
(Collinson, 1999), and using behaviorally based safety programs (Williams & Geller, 
2000) have all seen some (limited) success in reducing the number of workplace injuries. 
Each approach works to a certain extent but also presents unforeseen challenges.  
 For example, mandating OSHA compliance usually means creating an 
environmental health and safety department within an organization to enforce 
punishments for unsafe workplace behavior. Unfortunately, this means the department 
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can be seen as too punitive and can be resented. Employees may begin hiding unsafe 
workplace behaviors rather than not engaging in safe behaviors. 
 To avoid this issue, organizations may take a less punitive approach and (instead 
of punishing unsafe behaviors) reward safe workplace behaviors. For example, work 
groups may be compensated for maintaining a low injury rate. The logic here is that 
groups with a low injury rate should be engaging in safe behaviors. Unfortunately, this 
has been shown to lead to underreporting of accidents and injuries; what has been called 
impression management by concealment (Collinson, 1999). In this case the problem is 
placing a focus on outcome metrics rather than process dynamics. That is, rewarding an 
outcome (such as a low number of accidents) without any regard to how that was 
accomplished. Hofmann & Stetzer (1996) discuss the importance of focusing on process 
over outcome in their paper on factors influencing unsafe behaviors. They argue that 
focusing on outcomes only leads to employees taking shortcuts. In short, linking safety 
performance to pay encourages unintended and unsafe behaviors. 
 To circumvent this issue some organizations have implemented behaviorally 
based safety programs (DePasquale & Geller, 1999; Williams, & Geller, 2000). 
Behaviorally based safety programs are defined as programs that attempt to track safety 
processes along with safety outcomes. That is, bringing a focus onto the behaviors that 
should lead to reduced workplace injury as opposed to tracking behaviors that are 
deemed as unsafe work practices. For example, tracking (and rewarding) open safety 
discussion, following proper lock out/tag out protocol (a common safety technique in 
organizations that use large machines), and “catching” employees being safe. That is, 
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conducting audits that reward good safety behaviors rather than punishing poor safety 
behaviors. 
 This approach has seen some success (Williams & Geller, 2000) and is generally 
favored by employees (DesPasquale & Geller, 1999). However, this approach alone is 
not enough. It assumes a level of trust between front line employees and their direct 
supervisors (Geller, 1998), and (most importantly) shared organizational attitudes and 
norms about what safety is and to what degree it is valued. For example, DesPasquale & 
Geller (1999) found qualitative evidence in focus groups that a lack of buy-in from 
supervisors and peers can quickly derail a behaviorally based safety program. Williams & 
Geller (2000) argue that trust is the ingredient missing from most behaviorally based 
safety programs. Without trust shared norms cannot be created, and without those shared 
norms safety cannot be reached. Trust and safety lead to what is called safety culture. A 
strong safety culture is a key antecedent to safe behaviors and reduced accidents, injuries, 
and death (Hofmann & Morgeson 1999; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Zohar, 2010). 
 These concepts are of the utmost importance in high reliability organizations 
(HROs). These are organizations operating in high risk and unpredictable environments 
that strive for, and reach, safety and reliability in operations (Roberts & Rousseau, 1993). 
HROs are a subset of high risk organizations. Both operate in dangerous environments 
yet HROs manage to mitigate nearly all of the risk they encounter. What we learn from 
these organizations that operate in high risk environments can be generalized to other 
organizations (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). If they can manage to operate reliably 
perhaps we can learn from their practices. 
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 Practically speaking, this dissertation will focus on the relationships between one 
type of safety enhancing intervention (after action reviews) on safety climate. I will 
examine the attitudinal and behavioral variables associated with after action reviews and 
their relationship to safety climate. There will be a special focus on leadership, trust, 
supervisor behaviors, and perceived behavioral integrity. Taken together these variables 
focus on what group leaders can do to enhance the safety climate of their group.  
 Of interest to practitioners in the safety space this dissertation will inform after 
action review leadership and its relationship to safety climate. It is already clear that after 
action reviews have a strong relationship to safety climate (Allen, Baran, & Scott, 2001). 
However, the specific reasons- the actual behaviors- that make for the most effective after 
action reviews are still up for debate. This dissertation ought to help inform that 
discussion and move it forward by measuring supervisor behaviors and assessing their 
relationship to safety climate. 
 The relationship between trust, behavioral integrity, and safety climate is an 
unexplored yet vitally important area of research. In his paper on the future of safety 
climate, Zohar (2010) writes that behavioral integrity is a new and exciting direction in 
which to take safety climate research. This is because theory suggests it is a mechanism 
to leverage change in safety climate. Shared attitudes like safety climate can be difficult 
to change, especially when they have become entrenched over time. The idea that 
perceptions of one individual can affect shared safety attitudes is exciting because it 
provides an easier target for change. Describing what a supervisor can do to be perceived 
as more trustworthy (and be perceived as having more behavioral integrity) can truly help 
improve safety norms. Thus, a study critically examining the relationships 
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betweenperceived supervisor trust, behavioral integrity, and supervisor behaviors on 
safety climate is valuable for theory. 
 This type of information would be important in practice as well. Imagine a 
supervisor based behavioral best practices list for improving safety climate. Links could 
be made between one individual’s behavior and the accident rate of their team. Lives 
could be saved, accidents reduced, and employees could work in healthier environments. 
The connections between trust, behavioral integrity, AARs, and safety climate are vital to 
the high risk industry. This dissertation will attempt to make those first connections 
between these important constructs. 
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SAFETY CLIMATE AND SAFETY CULTURE 
 
 
 Weick (1987) argues that understanding organizational safety is really an issue of 
control. It is a balancing act between giving autonomy to organizational members and 
still ensuring that appropriate safety rules are being followed. That is, how can 
management get all employees to work safely without inundating them with a constant 
stream of safety micro-management? Micromanagement is a poor practice because it 
limits the flexibility of individuals and the organization. This flexibility is vital for high 
risk organizations. They need to be able to react to incidents as soon as they are 
perceived. In high risk organizations being slow to act can be fatal (Weick, 2001). Weick 
(1987) says that organizational culture is a way to enact centralized control via norms and 
attitudes (which are process and product of communicative interaction) while still 
enjoying the benefits of decentralized organizational structure. 
 In the case of safety, culture acts as a tool to keep all employees “on the same 
page” without over-constraining their behavior (Boin & Schulman, 2008; Bierly & 
Spender, 1995; Weick, 1987). This means that employees share the same deeply rooted 
underlying assumptions about how work is done. Weick argues that this is absolutely 
integral to maintaining reliability in high risk organizations. Safety culture goes beyond 
external motivators for safe behavior such as OSHA penalties, safety outcome rewards, 
and behaviorally based safety programs and creates an internal motivator for safe 
behaviors; one that is continuously reflected and reinforced via interaction among 
members as they strive to make sense of shifts in organizational environments (Scott & 
Trethewey, 2008). If organizational members truly value safety by enacting and 
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sustaining a culture that emphasizes its importance, then it will show up in their 
workplace behaviors. Safety culture is a tool used to reinforce that value. 
 Safety climate, on the other hand, is a measurable component of safety culture. 
Defined as the shared norms and attitudes concerning the relative importance of safety 
within an organization (or work group) symptomatic of an organization’s safety culture 
(Zohar, 2008). It is a surface feature of safety culture (Mearns & Flin, 1999) that can be 
manipulated (Denison, 1996) through organizational initiatives (behaviorally based safety 
programs, for example). It is logical to assume that the state of safety climate is 
somewhat indicative of the state of safety culture. A later section will discuss safety 
climate in more detail. 
Safety as a Social Construction 
 Although they are associated with objective organizational outcomes (e.g., 
mortality statistics, insurance costs), safety and danger are each intersubjective, 
negotiated social constructions (Turner & Gray, in press). Simpson (1996) argues that “in 
safety there is always the possibility that danger lurks unseen” (pg. 551). Because safety 
and danger are emergent and often misunderstood, there are no clear, objective, and 
consistent warning signs of safety (or danger). Because organizations are ultimately 
fallible entities, employee’s interpretations of risk and safety are often poor. To treat 
them as objective would only serve to invite even more unintended risk. What we 
consider to be dangerous depends on what we (as a group, organization, society, etc.) 
habitually label as dangerous. This is because we, as humans, rarely have all pertinent 
information about a situation and we could not process all of this information even if we 
did. However, we still draw conclusions about a given situation and act on them.  
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 Weick (2001) provides an excellent example of this in his chapter on the Mann 
Gulch disaster. He describes smokejumpers (forest firefighters) sent into a blaze to put it 
out. Due to the smoke and sound of the fire around them they were unable to verbally 
communicate with each other. The wind changed and suddenly the fire was coming 
towards them. One smokejumper was able to assess this information accurately and 
began creating an escape fire. However, he was unable to communicate his new 
information (that the wind changed and the fire was coming towards them) and his 
behavior seemed bizarre to on-looking smokejumpers (creating an escape fire was not 
standard procedure in the fire service at the time). By the time the rest of the team 
realized that the fire was coming towards them it was too late. 
 What was collectively assessed as safe by most of the smokejumpers was assessed 
as dangerous by one unable to communicate his opinion. In either case, the label of 
“safe” and “dangerous” is a subjective one. There is no doubt that I would label being 
near any type of wild fire as dangerous regardless of wind speed or direction while some 
smokejumpers may label it as safe (and still others as dangerous for different reasons).   
 What “counts” as safe is the product of a shared negotiated consensus. Here 
“negotiated” means “a set of ongoing processes (intentional and unintentional) through 
which knowledgeable individuals…engage, disengage, and accomplish 
reciprocal…influence over the intended meanings for participation in organizational 
functions” (Scott & Myers, 2010, pg. 80). Negotiated meaning is a function of 
individuals, their perceptions, and the process by which they communicate. Individuals 
differ as do their perceptions and communicative processes. More importantly, groups 
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differ in their shared perceptions. It is through interaction with one’s unique group that 
safety and danger are negotiated.  
 What works on a group level could also be brought up to the organization. What 
is discussed at one organization may not be discussed at another. Thus, the definition of 
safety and how safety is understood as relating to membership (and therefore safety and 
danger itself) must vary between organizations. These organizations are made up of 
different people in different groups with different shared attitudes.  
Organizational Culture and Sensemaking 
 The way a group defines safety in a given situation is a product of retrospective 
sensemaking. Retrospective sensemaking is a shared and dynamic process (Weick, 2001) 
through which individuals communicate with each other to make sense of their shared 
experiences with plausible interpretations and meaning. In reliability seeking 
organizations retrospective sensemaking is a powerful tool, as it can help to reduce 
ambiguity (Allen, et al, 2010) about dangerous situations turning them into learning 
opportunities.  
 Poor sensemaking has negative consequences as well. Consider the plausible 
explanations that allowed the Challenger and Discovery shuttles to launch. In both cases 
a possible error was found (faulty O-rings in the Challenger, the Discovery shedding 
parts of its hull during take-off) and considered unimportant to safety. The meaning 
behind weak O-rings, for example, was that it was within a margin of error (Boin & 
Schulmann, 1998). As Vaughan (1996) argues in her book on the Challenger disaster, 
NASA decision makers stopped using an engineering technical viewpoint and instead 
took the point of view of managers. This meant that risk previously considered 
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intolerable was suddenly within acceptable limits for a launch. The managerial point of 
view is plausible because as Simpson (1996) argues risk is always lurking. There is 
simply no way to launch a space shuttle with zero risk. Instead, an acceptable level of risk 
must be taken. The managerial viewpoint simply accepts a higher level of risk than the 
engineering technical viewpoint.  
 History tells us that this was a mistake. The wrong framework was used to launch 
the shuttle. Appropriate sensemaking could not occur. In short, retrospective 
sensemaking is the process of creating, sharing, and retaining narrative frameworks that 
sustain lessons and interpretations about safety and reliability. These lessons go on to 
shape organizational members’ interpretations of risk and safety in the workplace. 
Ideally, these interpretations are accurate and shared. 
 For example, Weick (1987) argues that storytelling is a mechanism by which 
culture promotes reliability. Indeed, the idea of stories and myths as tools of 
organizational culture has been successfully used before to study culture (Browning, 
2006; Martin, 1992). Weick (1987) proposes that culture allows an organization to 
centralize assumptions and attitudes while still allowing individuals to act in 
decentralized ways. This allows for some centralized control (which reduces some type 
of risk and liability) while still allowing for the decentralized autonomy of employees 
(which lets employees see novel errors before they grow to be catastrophic). These 
assumptions and attitudes that are shaped by culture are social constructions of reality. 
Says Weick, “Making meaning is an issue of culture” (1987, pg. 123). Thus, retrospective 
sensemaking as a cultural tool creates meaning about safety in high risk 
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organizations.AARs are a venue where group members share interpretations and attempt 
to develop and retain them through a shared narrative. 
 In his article on the subject, Weick (1987) states that culture “creates a 
homogenous set of assumptions and decision premises which… preserve coordination” 
(pg. 124). However, this assumes that organizational culture is a large, looming, and 
unified structure that affects all organizational members in a consistent way. Considering 
the size and complexity of modern organizations, this assumption seems questionable 
because the larger and more complex an organization, the more difficult it is to maintain 
a unified culture. Gherardi, Nicolini, & Odella (1998), for example, argue that definitions 
of safety and danger can vary within organizations. Their major finding is that 
organizational culture as a unitary and unchanging construct is false. This is interesting 
considering that is in contrast to traditional organizational culture research. Schein 
(1992), for example defines organizational culture as deeply held largely unconscious 
assumptions and beliefs that are shared among all organizational members. He argues 
that the most fundamental aspects of culture are shared among all members.  
 This same assumption (articulated or not) appears in other definitions of culture. 
Roussea (1990) created a five layer model of organizational culture. The top layer is the 
most accessible and is made up of organizational branding and logos. As the layers go 
deeper they become less accessible. Behavioral patterns give way to behavioral norms. 
These, in turn, give way to values and beliefs. Finally, the deepest layer is made up of 
shared assumptions outside of conscious awareness. These are the most difficult to assess 
and are assumed to be shared among all organizational members. In both Schein’s (1992) 
and Roussea’s (1990) theories, organizational culture is assumed to be unified. 
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 Instead, Gherardi, et al. (1998) argue that organizational culture (specifically 
safety culture) is negotiated and shared among groups or communities of practice within 
an organization (rather than the organization as a whole). In a large organization, 
consensus cannot be reasonably expected among all employees, especially when these 
employees spend their time organizing, negotiating, and making sense of the environment 
intersubjectively with their own work group. Their basic assumptions (conscious or not) 
may be shared within their work group with whom they interact with on a consistent 
basis. However, it seems unlikely that these assumptions would be shared organization-
wide. 
 Assuming that organizational culture is not unified, Martin & Meyerson (1988) 
provided a three part taxonomy of organizational culture. These are an “integrated” 
culture, a “differentiated” culture, and a “fragmented” culture. These move from most 
unified in culture to least unified. They argue that most organizations cannot have an 
integrated and unitary culture and instead fall into the category of “differentiation” or 
“fragmentation.” A differentiated culture is one in which subcultures form. These 
subcultures can coexist harmoniously or be in conflict. However, there is often some 
level of agreement within the subculture. A fragmented culture is one in which ambiguity 
reigns supreme. Events can be interpreted in many ways and clear consensus cannot be 
attained among subcultures. Considering the ambiguous, complex, and dangerous 
environments in which reliability seeking organizations operate (Roberts & Rousseau, 
1989), it is likely that an organization’s safety culture can be characterized by 
fragmentation or differentiation. Both acknowledge the role of ambiguity within the 
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organization and make room for consensus (or attempts at consensus building) within the 
work group.  
 Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed (2007) argue that safety culture should be 
examined on a subculture or departmental level. They see it as counterproductive to work 
towards an overall organizational safety culture and to instead accept the fact that natural 
groups within the organization will have their own sets of shared attitudes, assumptions, 
values, and beliefs concerning safety. Thus, it makes sense that the unit of analysis for 
safety culture should not be the organization, but rather the work group. Organizational 
safety culture is too broad a tool to be useful. Instead, group safety culture is the most 
logical unit of analysis. It is with the group that employees communicate primarily. It is 
with the group that employees socially construct the meaning of safety and hazards 
(Simpson, 1996) and engage in retrospective sensemaking. Thus, it is in the group that 
we should examine shared, communicatively enacted cultural artifacts.For example, 
consider Scott & Trethewey’s (2008) study of firefighters. They found that firefighters 
accentuate and attenuate certain aspects (concerning safety) of the environment to 
preserve a certain sense of self. That is, they bring to light and place an importance on 
some aspects of their environment while brushing over other aspects. They engage in 
sensemaking on the group level. 
 Firefighters work in separate crews with relatively stable membership and 
supervisory status. The general aspects of the environment that are accentuated and 
attenuated may be shared across crews; however, the specific aspects likely are not. 
Firefighting crews experience their environment (and subsequently make sense of it) with 
members of their own crew, not necessarily with all other crews. Thus we would expect 
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there to be within group consistency and between group variations in each crews’ 
interpretations of hazards and safety because they are accentuating and attenuating 
different environmental aspects.  
 Scott & Trethewey (2008) provide evidence of both 1) the idea that safety and 
danger are socially constructed and 2) that this construction can and does occur on the 
group (or subculture) level. Collinson (1999) also shows qualitative evidence of this 
phenomenon when studying oil rig workers. In his study, the employees on the oil rigs 
(which are out at sea) and upper management (whose offices are located on land) created 
different meanings for the organizational practice of linking a group’s safety record to 
pay. To upper management linking one’s safety performance record to their pay created a 
culture of accountability and safety. To the employees on the rigs it created a culture of 
“us vs them” where it was assumed that small accidents would go unreported because 
employees didn’t want to lose pay. The same seemingly objective stimuli (linking safety 
performance to pay) reflected and sustained divergent attitudes and values among 
different subgroups within the organization. 
 Of course, cultural messages from the organization (as opposed to the work 
group) can affect a group’s shared social construction. However, it makes sense to 
assume that how these messages are perceived is mediated by group level interpretations. 
Zohar & Luria (2005) conducted a hierarchical analysis supporting the idea that group 
safety climate is nested within organizational safety climate. Ultimately, the largest 
amount of variance in predicting actual accident rates was claimed by group, not 
organizational, safety climate. Allen, et al. (2010) also reported that group safety climate 
had a stronger relationship with safety outcomes than organizational safety climate, 
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although their study was not hierarchical. This makes sense. One’s immediate group 
should have a stronger relationship to shared group attitudes than the larger organization 
in which the group is nested. 
Safety Climate 
 Zohar (2010) provides a different name for the socially constructed negotiation of 
what aspects of the environment the group considers safe or dangerous- group safety 
climate. He defines group safety climate as the shared attitudes about the relative 
importance of safety within a work group. Denison (1996) describes the difference 
between culture and climate. He argues that climate refers to a situation and its link to 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of organizational members. Culture, in contrast, refers 
to a context (within which a situation may be embedded). Culture is rooted in history 
which is collectively held and sufficiently complex to resist many attempts at direct 
manipulation.  
 He goes on to identify other differences between culture and climate. One 
important distinction is the relationship between the individual and the culture or climate 
in which they are embedded. Climate research focuses more on the effect of a specific 
climate on the individual (or group of individuals) rather than the creation of a climate by 
individuals. Culture research, alternatively, is focused on the creation of the social 
context by organizational members. This distinction is likely due to the theoretical 
foundation of climate research. Lewin (1951) argues that behavior is a function of the 
interaction between the individual and the environment. That is, the individual is separate 
from the environment. This is a logical framework if you are interested in the effect of 
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climate on organizational members. It is quite problematic if you are interested in the 
way organizational members create (and then are affected by) their own culture.  
 Further, Denison (1996) identifies different epistemologies for culture and 
climate. Climate comes from a positivist background as evidenced by the quantitative 
approach often used to study it. Culture, on the other hand, takes a post-modern 
perspective which, as a fundamental characteristic, does not allow variable analytic 
comparisons as a way to uncover truth. Because all experience is relative and subjective 
(according to post-modern scholars) it would not make sense to study and compare 
different organizational cultures or dimensions of culture. It implies values on categories 
that the researcher cannot possible know. Thus, culture researchers often use qualitative 
methods to get at the “deep structure of the organization…which is rooted in values, 
beliefs, and assumptions…where meaning is created through socialization…and 
interaction reproduces a symbolic world” (Denison, 1996, pg. 624). 
 Mearns & Flin (1999) examine the specific case of safety culture and climate. 
They conclude that safety climate can be regarded as a surface feature of safety culture. 
The important distinction for my study is the concept of manipulation. If attitudes about 
the relative importance of safety on the group level are intersubjective and negotiated 
then they are, by definition, changeable. Culture, as described by Denison (1996) and 
Mearns & Flin (1999) seems to be more of a static construct (or at least slower changing). 
Choudhry, et al. (2007) echo these researchers and argue that safety climate is a 
measurable product of safety culture. This is the theoretical approach that will be used for 
the current study. Thus, as a researcher I land closer to the positivist (rather than 
interpretive) tradition with some reservations. I assume that the shared attitudes measured 
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by quantitative measures of climate are appropriate for comparison across groups and 
organizations. However, I acknowledge that climate is a merely a component embedded 
within a larger cultural context. The entirety of the cultural context would require 
extensive qualitative inquiry. Climate is merely a surface feature of culture, but a 
meaningful, measurable, and comparable feature. 
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ANTECEDENTS TO SAFETY CLIMATE 
 
 
 The measure of safety climate used in this study (Zohar, 1980) taps into 
perceptions of what a supervisor expects, rewards, and supports in the context of safety. 
Thus, it makes sense to study potential antecedents of safety climate that would shape 
employee’s perceptions of supervisor expectations. It also makes sense to examine the 
variables that could influence how seriously supervisor expectations are taken. For 
example, supervisor led AARs are a great opportunity to shape safety climate by 
reinforcing supervisor expectations around safety. Perceptions of supervisor 
trustworthiness and behavioral integrity give the supervisor (and their expectations) 
legitimacy. As I argue later in this paper, trustworthy supervisors are more likely to be 
“repaid”. If these trustworthy supervisors are engaging in frequent AARs then they are 
likely to be “repaid” with a stronger safety climate. 
Retrospective Sensemaking 
 Safety climate refers to the measurable shared attitudes about safety that are a 
product of group retrospective sensemaking. Retrospective sensemaking is a dynamic, 
communicative, and intersubjective process which has been used to explain a variety of 
phenomena (Weick, 1995). In the high reliability and safety literature retrospective 
sensemaking is the theoretical framework used to explain how organizational members 
identify hazardous shifts in their environments and come to a shared understanding of 
what is more or less dangerous. 
 Weick, et al. (1999) argue that successful sensemaking is the process that leads to 
a state of shared group knowledge called collective mindfulness. Organizational members 
literally make sense of past shared events piecing together their meaning and implications 
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for future events. It is an ongoing learning process that ultimately improves reliability 
within these organizations. 
 Both safety climate and group retrospective sensemaking about safety and danger 
are constantly renegotiated through communicative means. They are emergent and 
perishable so they must be continually reaccomplished via interaction. AARs are the 
venue for this interaction. The safety climate that is measured by a quantitative 
assessment is the outcome of group sensemaking. Indeed, Allen, et al. (2010) found a 
positive relationship between AARs and group safety climate. AARs are group meetings 
after an event used to discuss what happened, what could have been done differently, and 
how it could have been improved. They are structured opportunities to engage in 
retrospective sensemaking. AARs are usually conducted on the group level and their 
ultimate goal is to detect and analyze errors which serve to reduce them in the future 
(Van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005).  They are opportunities to share stories 
about learning experiences which in turn improve reliability (Weick, 1987). This is 
because the shared perception of safety and danger is strengthened and brought up to date 
with new information. Each “round” of sensemaking (properly executed) acts as a 
revision on meaning which identifies errors and fixes them. AARs are one way 
organizational members can engage in retrospective sensemaking. 
 Considering the previously established relationship between AAR frequency and 
safety climate (Allen, et al, 2010) it is likely that I will find a similar relationship. Thus, 
as a form of replication I suggest the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: AAR frequency will be positively related to safety climate. 
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 AARs are frequently used in the military and fire service in which group members 
discuss events after the fact (Baran & Scott, 2010). Topics of discussion usually involve 
what went right, what went wrong, and what could be improved for the next time. They 
are especially effective in the fire service because of the discrete calls that a fire crew 
engages in. Firefighters get a call, race to the scene of a fire (or medical emergency), 
then, when they are finished come back to the station. This is a great opportunity to 
engage in retrospective sensemaking via an AAR. 
Perceived Supervisor Trustworthiness 
 Cox, Jones, & Collinson (2006) argue that trust is integral to safety culture 
because it creates expectations that managerial commitments to safety are valid. Trust 
sets up a framework from which all organizational members can work towards common 
goals (such as safety or reliable operations). Rotter (1967) defines trust as “an expectancy 
held by an individual or group that the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of 
another individual can be relied on” (pg. 650). Trust leads to open and honest 
communication among group members because of the implied congruence between what 
an individual says and what they do drives honesty (Simons, 1999). As I will argue later 
in this paper behavioral integrity (the congruence between words and deeds) leads to 
perceptions of trust which in turn drives honesty and open communication.  
 Trust is vitally important to leadership, especially in high risk organizations, 
because honest communication can aid in accurate risk appraisal (Cox, et al, 2006). For 
example, if a group member feels that they are not adequately trained to do a dangerous 
task they ought to bring it up to their peers and supervisor. To feel comfortable doing this 
trust needs to be present. Fear of retribution or punishment may impede that person from 
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being open and honest. Perceived managerial trustworthiness drives safe behaviors 
through honest and open communication via an exchange relationship. 
 Using social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), Cox, et al. (2006) argue that 
perceptions of managerial trustworthiness in regards to safety will be rewarded by safe 
behaviors. They conducted two case studies and found that “low levels of trust resulted in 
a lack of cooperation and communication among employees and managers” (pg. 1136). 
Hofmann & Morgeson (1999) conducted a similar study and found corroborating results. 
They found that supportive leaders (as measured by leader-member exchange) in a high 
risk organization were “repaid” with more open safety communication and safety 
behaviors. While they used leader-member exchange (instead of perceived supervisor 
trustworthiness), they still provided evidence in support of social exchange theory as a 
valid framework to study safety and perceptions of leaders.  
 Conversely, DePasquale & Geller (1999) found evidence for the role of distrust as 
a barrier to safe behaviors. They conducted focus groups and interviews and found trust 
to be a major theme in engaging in a behaviorally based safety program. They also found 
that a lack of buy-in by front line supervisors, a lack of transparent communication 
concerning safety from top management, and the use of negative feedback as other 
obstacles to using a behaviorally based safety program. Further, they found quantitative 
evidence across 20 organizations that trust in peers and management was related to 
engaging in a behaviorally based safety program. “Interpersonal trust is what’s missing in 
a culture deemed unready for behavior based safety” (Geller, 1998, pg. 14). 
 Another example of the importance of trust in high risk organizations is a study 
conducted by Collinson (1999) who examined an offshore oil rig’s safety culture. He 
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studied the effects of an organizational policy where safe behaviors were linked to 
compensation and other material rewards via scores on safety performance reviews. This 
was done by providing bonuses to work groups that went a certain number of shifts 
without a recorded accident. Unfortunately, this led to underreporting accidents. 
Employees did not communicate errors because, in short, it was punished.  
 Employees were not cooperating with management because that could lead to 
losing a job. Management was asking employees to report accidents while punishing 
these accidents. Thus, they were unintentionally punishing accident reporting. From the 
perspective of the oil rig employees, management could not be trusted with accurate 
accident information. To compensate for this the employees underreported their accident 
rates. A low level of perceived trust in this case was “repaid” with underreporting of 
accidents. 
 Conchie & Donald (2006) corroborated these case study findings with a 
quantitative study examining trust and distrust in an HRO. They found that trust is related 
to accident rates and shared attitudes about safety. Much like Hoffman & Morgeson 
(1999) who argue that subordinates repay a supportive supervisor (as measured by leader-
member exchange) by engaging in more open safety communication and safety 
behaviors, it is reasonable to expect that subordinates repay a trustworthy supervisor by 
engaging in open and honest retrospective sensemaking in AARs. Cox, et al. (2006) 
argue that high levels of trust within an organization, specifically in the relationship 
between a supervisor and their subordinate, can lead to open and honest communication. 
Kramer (1999) found that high levels of trust were related to group cooperation and 
information sharing.  
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 Considering the previous section on perceived supervisor trustworthiness and the 
link that Conchie & Donaldson (2006) and Cox, et al. (2006) make between perceptions 
of supervisor trustworthiness and safety attitudes, behaviors, and ultimately, safety 
climate; I propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis2: Perceived supervisor trust will be positively related to safety climate. 
 Hofmann & Morgeson (1999) found a similar relationship between leader 
supportiveness and more open safety communication (defined as bringing up safety 
concerns). Considering the evidence supporting perceived leader trustworthiness leading 
to repayment from subordinates it is likely that leader supportiveness is an artifact of 
perceived trustworthiness. That is, trustworthy leaders are likely viewed as supportive, 
but supportive leaders are not necessarily viewed as trustworthy. While the two are 
related, it is clear that perceived leader trustworthiness is linked to group cooperation, 
information sharing in a group, safety related attitudes, and safety related behaviors (in 
the proper high risk context). Leader supportiveness is simply along for the ride.  
 Retrospective sensemaking is a communicative process that benefits greatly from 
open communication and group cooperation. Open and honest sensemaking (which 
ideally occurs in AARs (Scott, Allen, Bonilla, Baran & Murphy, under review), in turn, 
leads to appropriate shared meaning concerning hazards, which then improves group 
safety climate. Thus we would expect a positive relationship between perceived 
supervisor trust and group safety climate. In fact, this relationship would trump the 
relationship between LMX and safety climate because of the clear links between 
perceived supervisor trust and group cooperation and shared safety attitudes (Collinson, 
1999; Conchie & Donaldson, 2006; Cox, et al., 2006; DePasquale & Geller, 1999). That 
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is, the link between LMX and group cooperation has not been suggested in previous 
research (although the relationship between LMX and safety attitudes has been). Further, 
perceived supervisor trust is a more specific characteristic of a supervisor compared to 
general supervisor supportiveness. Thus, it ought to have stronger relationship with safety 
climate. For this reason I propose the following two part hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3a: LMX will be positively related to safety climate.  
Hypothesis 3b: Perceived supervisor trust will be positively related to safety climate 
above and beyond LMX. 
Behavioral Integrity 
 Whitener, Brodt, Kosgaard, & Werner (1998) argue that there are five categories 
of behaviors that influence trust. These are behavioral consistency, behavioral integrity, 
sharing of accurate information, delegation of control, and concern for the welfare of 
subordinates. Kouzes & Posner (1992) argue that subordinates are more likely to trust a 
supervisor if he or she practices what they preach- that is, if he or she exhibits behavioral 
integrity. 
 Behavioral integrity is a subjective perception of an individual or organization 
and is defined as “the perceived congruence between values expressed by words and 
those expressed by actions” (Simons, 1999, pg. 90). Carlson & Perrewe (1995) argue 
trust requires integrity while Simons (1999) suggests that the best way to build integrity 
is “through actions consistent with espoused values” (pg. 92). 
 Many definitions of trust include a component of behavioral integrity (Simons, 
1999). Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) found that integrity was a factor of 
organizational trust in an empirical study. This makes sense when you consider what trust 
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really is. As mentioned in a previous section, Rotter (1967) defines trust as “an 
expectancy held by an individual or group that the word, promise, verbal, or written 
statement of another individual can be relied on” (pg. 650). Consistency is essential. An 
individual must show a pattern of consistent and reliable behavior to be perceived as 
trustworthy. A way to be seen as consistent and reliable is to follow through on words 
with deeds. Thus, behavioral integrity should be a primary antecedent to the perception of 
trust which in turn will lead to improved safety climate. To test this I propose the 
following two part hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4a: Behavioral integrity will have a positive relationship to safety climate. 
Hypothesis 4b: Supervisor trust will mediate the relationship between behavioral integrity 
and safety climate. 
 
 
 
 Simons (2002) places trust immediately after behavioral integrity in a conceptual 
model of the antecedents and outcomes of the construct. In a study on race, trust, and 
behavioral integrity, Simons, Friedman, Liu, & Parks (2007) found that perceptions of 
supervisor behavioral integrity were strongly related to perceptions of supervisor trust.  
 I have proposed in hypothesis 4b that the perception of supervisor behavioral 
integrity is an antecedent to perceptions of a trustworthy supervisor. This occurs through 
the mechanism of a supervisor exhibiting consistent and reliable behaviors (with their 
espoused safety values) which leads to the expectation that a supervisor’s words can be 
relied upon. This trust, in turn, enhances retrospective sensemaking occurring in AARs. 
Behavioral 
Integrity 
 
Group Safety 
Climate 
 
Perceived 
Supervisor Trust 
 
FIGURE 1: Behavioral Integrity and Safety Climate 
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This is through a reciprocation process where a trustworthy supervisor is “repaid” by 
subordinates for his or her trustworthiness by engaging in the shared, intersubjective, and 
cooperative sensemaking process within AARs. 
 Subordinates repay their supervisor with high quality sensemaking during AARs 
because perceptions of trust lead to information sharing (Bonacich & Schneider, 1992) 
and group cooperation (Yamagashi & Cook, 1993) - two important characteristics of the 
sensemaking process.  It can be argued that too much information sharing could also lead 
to ambiguity and thus not aid in the sensemaking process. However, consider that 
sensemaking is about constantly sharing to create emergent frameworks about safety and 
reliability. Information sharing is a necessary component of this. Group cooperation is 
certainly a necessary component of this as well. The only possible way information 
sharing and group cooperation could degrade sensemaking is if there is already so much 
of it that it is a detriment. This does not seem like a rational assumption to make about 
groups considering it is unclear how much group cooperation is too much and that a 
certain level of information sharing and group cooperation is absolutely necessary for 
sensemaking to occur at all. 
 The relationship between supervisor trustworthiness and sensemaking in AARs 
will, however, depend on the frequency of opportunities to engage in group sensemaking. 
AARs are an excellent example of opportunities for sensemaking. They are the context 
that frames what a supervisor expects, rewards, and supports. If your supervisor held 
frequent meetings to discuss specific events it would likely send the message to you that 
your supervisor values something about those events. Further, if you perceived your 
supervisor as trustworthy (perhaps because they exhibit behavioral integrity) then it 
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would likely strengthen the message of what your supervisor expects, rewards, and 
supports. The two would interact to form attitudes in you the subordinate. Thus, I propose 
that AAR frequency will moderate the relationship between supervisor trustworthiness 
and retrospective sensemaking, the successful outcome of which is group safety climate. 
Hypothesis 5: AAR frequency will moderate the relationship between perceived 
supervisor trust and group safety climate such that higher levels of AAR frequency will 
strengthen the relationship between supervisor trust and safety climate. 
 
 
  
 
 
 The outcome of successful retrospective sensemaking (appropriately identifying 
hazards in the environment) is group safety climate. A strong group safety climate is one 
in which safety is highly regarded and seen as more important than other organizational 
demands. Good retrospective sensemaking ought to lead to placing a strong importance 
on safety.  
 Further, leader behaviors during an AAR ought to have an relationship to safety 
climate. That is, leader behaviors during an AAR make for a good (or bad) AAR. This is 
because AARs are leader-led events. How a leader runs a meeting will affect the outcome 
of that meeting. The supervisor behaviors used in this study are empirically derived from 
firefighters who engage in AARs. They are literally subject matter experts on the topic of 
what makes for a good AAR. It follows that these behaviors ought to have a positive 
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FIGURE 2: AAR Frequency as a Moderator 
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relationship to safety climate considering AARs are a venue for sensemaking where a 
supervisor can highlight what they expect, reward, and support. 
 These supervisor AAR behaviors would likely be mediated by trust perceptions. 
This is because leader behaviors enhance perceptions of trust, especially when they are in 
line with espoused values.  
Hypothesis 6a: Good AAR leader behaviors will have a positive relationship to safety 
climate. 
Hypothesis 6b: Perceived supervisor trust will mediate the relationship between good 
leader behaviors and safety climate. 
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FIGURE 3: Good AAR Leader Behaviors 
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METHODS 
 
 
Procedure  
 
 I conducted a study in which participants were surveyed about their attitudes 
regarding their group, their supervisor, the frequency of and nature of team meetings, and 
their perceptions of safety. Considering the shared nature of the constructs and the shared 
nature of the theories I am using (group retrospective sensemaking, group safety climate, 
etc.) I aggregated all measures to the group level. Using ordinary least squares regression 
and exploratory factor analysis I tested my hypotheses. Survey items were administered 
using an internet based survey that was accessible from work or home. 
Participants 
 Participants were firefighters in different crews and stations in a large city in the 
American southeast. Participants were asked to identify their station and crew so they 
could be appropriately grouped. Because the ultimate dependent variable in this study 
(group safety climate) is a group level variable, all data was aggregated to the group 
level, in this case it is the crew level. Crews provide an excellent natural group to study 
because firefighters work consistently with the same crew members including their 
supervisor (crew captain). This provides opportunity to engage in retrospective 
sensemaking-the process that should improve safety climate and reliability. 
 In total 376 firefighters started the survey but they did not all complete it. 330 
cases were left when incomplete data was removed. Out of this number 208 (63%) were 
crew members while 122 (37%) were crew captains. This study focused on crew member 
perceptions of their group and their supervisor. To aggregate perceptions to the 
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appropriate target I removed all captains that completed the survey. All following 
demographics and analyses focus on the 208 crew members that completed the survey. 
 The fire service is a male dominated field and this sample reflects that. 197 
(94.7%) of the participants that completed the survey are male. The average age of the 
sample is 38 years and the average organizational tenure is 12.4 years. Both age and 
tenure were normally distributed. 
Measures 
 All scales on the survey used a 5 point response scale, Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree. Table 1 has a list of means, standard deviations, and sample sizes 
(individual and group) for each scale.  
TABLE 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Aggregation Statistics 
Variable 
Individual 
N 
Group 
N 
Mean SD Alpha Rwg ICC(1) ICC(2) 
AAR Frequency 208 69 3.71 .37 .70 0.80 0.25 0.61 
LMX 208 69 3.91 .57 .67 0.67 0.57 0.88 
Safety Climate 208 69 3.70 .58 .96 0.75 0.66 0.94 
AAR Leader 
Behaviors 
207 69 3.87 .53 .97 0.75 0.66 0.97 
Behavioral Integrity 206 69 3.84 .57 .97 0.68 0.82 0.97 
Perceived 
Supervisor Trust 
206 69 4.06 .53 .79 0.81 0.38 0.80 
Note. Mean and SD represent group values. 
 
 Behavioral Integrity. This construct was measured using a scale of behavioral 
integrity that can be found in Simons, et al. (2007). The scale is well validated and 
assesses subordinate perceptions of supervisor integrity. Simons, et al. (2007) found an 
alpha coefficient of .87 for this scale. In this sample the alpha coefficient was .97 with a 
mean of 3.84 (SD=.57). Sample items include, there is a match between my manager’s 
words and actions, and, my manager delivers on promises. 
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 Perceived Supervisor Trust. This construct was measured using a portion of the 
Interpersonal Trust at Work Scale (Cook & Wall, 1980) that assesses trust in a leader. 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter (1990) conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis and found strong evidence that the construct is unidimensional and reliable with 
a Tucker-Lewis goodness-of-fit statistic of .96. In this sample the alpha coefficient was 
.79 and the mean was 4.06 (SD=.53). Sample items include, I feel quite confident that my 
leader will always try to treat me fairly, and, I feel a strong loyalty to my leader. The 
scale has six items. 
 Group Safety Climate. Safety climate was measured using Zohar & Luria’s 
(2005) scale of group safety climate. This is an extremely popular scale of safety climate 
and has been studied in various contexts, cultures, and organizational settings. Allen, et 
al. (2010) found an alpha coefficient of .96 for this scale. In this sample the alpha 
coefficient was .96 with a mean of 3.7 (SD=.58). Items include, My direct supervisor 
says a good word to workers who pay special attention to safety, and, my direct 
supervisor discusses how to improve safety with us all. This scale has 16 items. 
 AAR Frequency. A seven item scale was used to assess AAR frequency. In this 
sample it had an alpha coefficient of .70 with a mean of 3.71 (SD=.37). A sample item is 
we frequently conduct after action reviews after a call. 
 Leader-Member Exchange. Scandura and Pellegrini (2008) LMX-7 measures the 
relationship between a supervisor and subordinate. LMX is a frequently used scale and 
has well established reliability and validity. A sample item is, I usually feel that I know 
where I stand with my immediate supervisor. In this sample the alpha coefficient was .67 
with a mean of 3.91 (SD=.57). The scale has seven items. 
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 AAR LeaderBehaviors. As part of a previous study (Bonilla, unpublished 
manuscript) firefighters were given an online survey about safety norms, attitudes, and 
after action reviews. One section asked in an open-ended format to describe what makes 
for a good and a bad AAR. The question was “In your own words, what makes for a good 
AAR”. Out of 247 possible participants, 163 completed this portion of the survey. Results 
show that there were no significant differences on responses to this survey item based on 
tenure, organizational position (captain vs firefighter) age, sex, or race (p> .05) using 
simple t-tests. Roughly 50% of participants who completed this portion of the survey 
were captains.The scale has 11 items. 
 Working with other subject-matter experts we categorized the answers in groups 
of common responses using a constant comparative method (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I 
first coded responses using an emic approach where I let the wording of the responses 
drive the wording of the categories. I then went back and reviewed my coding method to 
consolidate categories in some instances and split up categories in others. I then created 
definitions of each coding category and provided it to other subject matter-experts. They 
reviewed my codes and definitions. Interestingly, respondents referenced the importance 
of their supervisor in good AARs frequently without being prompted. This suggested that 
leadership was an important part of AAR effectiveness. Finally, this led to the item 
creation process. 
 I created sample items, had another subject matter expert vet and revise them, had 
another subject-matter expert review them and then made changes based on feedback. 
This process continued until agreement on items was reached. Eleven categories were 
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identified for the item asking about what makes a good AAR. See table 2 for the results 
of the study.  
 In this study the alpha coefficient was .97 with a mean of 3.87 (SD=.53). The 
assumption of an alpha coefficient is unidimensionality. For this reason an exploratory 
factor analysis was conducted to test for dimensionality. Results are discussed in the 
following section and are displayed in table 3. 
 
 
TABLE 2: Themes and Definitions of a Good After Action Review 
Good AAR Themes 
Theme Conceptual Definition Example Percent 
Strengths 
Any discussion of what went 
right during a call, praise for 
appropriate actions (positive 
reinforcement), or general 
discussion of behaviors worth 
repeating. 
"Praise where 
deserved." "Praise 
those for doing 
well." "What went 
right." 
27% 
Growth 
Areas 
Any discussion of what went 
wrong during a call, pointing out 
mistakes, or areas that need 
training/elaboration.  This 
includes constructive criticism. 
"Discuss what we 
could have done 
better." "What went 
wrong." 
43% 
Group 
involveme
nt 
A discussion that involves all 
members of the crew (and no one 
else) that were involved.  One in 
which multiple points of view are 
represented and questions are 
asked. 
"Everyone gets a 
chance to speak." 
"Everyone talks, 
they verbalize 
concerns." 
20% 
Respect 
Showing respect for other 
members of the crew.  This can 
involve emotional respect, 
listening to others, or generally 
showing empathy for other crew 
members. 
"Asking are you 
ok." "Don’t acuse."  
22% 
Capt/Mode
rator 
Any mention of a discussion 
moderator or the importance of 
someone taking charge of the 
conversation. 
"Clear direction." 
"Don’t arm chair 
quarterback." 
9% 
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Open 
Comm./Ho
nesty 
Engaging in open dialogue with 
crew members.  This includes 
being honest and clear with crew 
members and allowing everyone 
their turn.  It also includes having 
freedom of voice. 
"Open discussion."  
"Be honest and 
fair." 
40% 
Task 
Focused 
Discussing the specifics of the 
call including what everyone 
actually did during the call.  This 
includes being objective during 
the discussion and focusing on 
actions rather than individuals. 
"Objectivity."  
"Discuss why we 
did what we did." 
24% 
Relaxed/O
pen 
Creating an atmosphere that 
allows for easy communication 
among crew members.  This 
includes being informal, being 
relaxed, and having a generally 
positive attitude about the 
process. 
"Try to create a 
positive atmosphere 
for discussion." 
"Decompress and 
lower stress." 
14% 
Prompt 
Making sure that the AAR starts 
on time and does not run long. 
"Do it as soon as 
possible." 
"Immediate 
feedback." 
5% 
Learning 
Any specific mention of learning, 
education, or a learning 
opportunity. 
"We mention what 
went extremely 
well to assure 
others will know 
and learn from it.    
We point out the 
small things we 
experienced to 
assure information 
available to all."   
13% 
Humor 
Any mention of jokes, laughing, 
or comedy. 
"Good jokes.  
Pointing out funny 
things that 
happened." "Find 
some humor." 
2% 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to assess the unidimensionality of 
the supervisor AAR behavior scale. A principal axis factor analysis was conducted and 
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factors were allowed to rotate. One factor was extracted and accounted for 68.5% of the 
variance in the sum of square loadings. The eigenvalue was 12.6 for the first factor. The 
second factor had an eigenvalue of .84. If an eigenvalue falls below 1.0 it suggests that 
the factor accounts for less variance than any given item and does not reduce the scale 
into a subset of factors. For these reasons a 1 factor solution is the most appropriate 
interpretation of these data. See table 3 for a list of items and factor loadings. All items 
start with the stem During AARs our captain… 
TABLE 3: Factor Loadings for Supervisor AAR Behaviors 
Supervisor AAR Behavior Scales 
Factor 
Loadings 
Gives praise where it is deserved. .87 
Praises us for the good things we did during the call. .88 
Praises us for what went right during the call. .88 
Discusses what we could have done better during the call. .81 
Talks about what went wrong during the call. .65 
Allows everyone a chance to speak. .81 
Encourages us to speak up about the call. .86 
Asks how we felt about the call. .87 
Respects the concerns of crew members. .88 
Provides clear direction for the meeting. .88 
Encourages us to voice our concerns. .90 
Encourages us to listen to the speaker. .86 
Discusses everyone's role during the call. .90 
Discusses actions, not people, that were right or wrong. .81 
Starts the meeting promptly after the call. .70 
Points out small things crew members experienced so that others can learn. .85 
Talks about what can be learned from the call. .84 
Points out funny things that happened during the call. .53 
Note. N=239. 
 
 An examination of these factor loadings suggests that the humor item loads 
poorest onto the scale. Considering the themes of the other items (serious discussions, 
good meeting practices, learning) this makes sense. Interestingly, the item discusses what 
went wrong during the call loads poorly as well. However, the item directly above it, 
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discusses what we could have done better during the call, loads very well. This suggests 
an issue of wording rather than meaning. Perhaps the negative wording (use of the word 
“wrong”) caused it to load differently than the more positive wording of the previous 
item (use of the word “better”). 
Aggregation of Variables 
 The theoretical backing for this study is group level phenomenon. For this reason 
the focal variables were aggregated to the group level. In this case the group is a 
firefighting crew. In the fire service crew members work almost exclusively together 
(barring covering a coworker’s shift) and thus have opportunity to create group norms 
and a group climate.  
 There are very specific steps for aggregation outlined by LeBreton & Senter 
(2008) and earlier by Bliese (2000). First, the dataset must meet three criteria. The unit of 
analysis must occur naturally, there must be within group homogeneity, and there must 
be between group heterogeneity. The dataset meets all three criteria. As described earlier, 
firefighters work in crews as their primary work group. They direct up to a consistent 
captain who acts as their supervisor. Crews vary in size; in this sample the average crew 
had around 3 members with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 7. 
 The second and third criteria are met using three statistics. All aggregation values 
can be found in table 1. The first statistical value is rwg(j) which is a measure of within 
group agreement. To calculate this I first restructured the dataset as described by 
LeBreton & Senter (2008). I then ran a calculation that compares the observed variance 
in group member ratings of a target (safety climate for example) to the expected variance 
if their responses were completely random.  
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 Picture a histogram of responses for each group. The response options are made 
up of the 5 point scale I provided on the survey. If the group members had perfect 
agreement then the histogram would have all the responses bucketed into one response 
option (let us say option 4 in the example). If they had perfect disagreement then their 
response options would be spread evenly across the 5 points scale and would create a 
rectangular shaped histogram. The rwg(j) statistics compares the actual response histogram 
to a rectangular histogram. The more different they are, the higher the rwg(j), and the more 
confidence we have that there is within group homogeneity. An rwg(j) is calculated for 
each group. These values are then averaged for each variable in question.  
 Technically, one can get negative values for this statistic, but that is usually a sign 
that the dataset has not been properly organized. So, in practice the statistic ranges from 0 
to 1.0 with .70 as a rule of thumb cut-off for agreement (Bliese, 2000). For this study the 
rwg(j) values exceeded the .70 cut off for AAR frequency (.80), safety climate (.75), 
supervisor AAR behaviors (.75), and perceived supervisor trust (.81). The values fell just 
short of the .70 cutoff for LMX (.67) and for behavioral integrity (.68). This suggests that 
there is slightly more within group variance than would be ideal for LMX and behavioral 
integrity. 
 However, there is another statistic that can be used to assess within group 
homogeneity- ICC(1). This statistic can be interpreted as the proportion of variance 
attributed to group membership. Consider that simply being in a group can have a 
relationship to individual attitudes. Indeed, that is exactly what I argue in this paper. This 
effect can then be split into (explained by) different aspects of the group. For example, a 
group’s supervisor may enact certain behaviors that elicit certain attitudes from all group 
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members. ICC(1) tells us how much variance can be explained by group level 
phenomenon. The ICC(1) values are high for the variables in question. AAR frequency 
was .25, LMX was .57, safety climate was .66, AAR leader behavior was .66, behavioral 
integrity was .82, and perceived supervisor trust was .38. These suggest good within 
group homogeneity.  
 The final criterion for aggregation is between group heterogeneity. ICC(2) is a 
statistic that tells us if the group means for each variable are reliably different. If the 
group means are too close to each other (and unreliable) then we cannot be sure their 
differences are due to group level phenomenon (unless there is much more statistical 
power). In this case we want there to be a lot of variance across groups (which means a 
lot of variance to account for with our variables). ICC(2) tells us if the group means are 
different enough to derive meaningful relationships. Bliese (2000) suggests a cutoff of 
.70 for this statistic. Only AAR frequency fell below this mark with an ICC(2) value of 
.61. LMX was .88, safety climate was .94, AAR leader behavior was .97, behavioral 
integrity was .97, and perceived supervisor trust was .80.   
 Considering the amount of variance accounted for by group level phenomena as 
illustrated in table 1, the use of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) does not seem 
appropriate. HLM is used primarily when the researcher is interested in examining both 
level 1 (in this case individual level) and level 2 (group level) sources of variance. In this 
study the high ICC(2) values suggest that there is very little variance attributable to 
individual sources in the variables measured. Thus, there would be no significant 
individual level sources of variance. Consider also that there is no theoretical reason to 
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run multilevel modeling either. That is, the phenomena studied ought to occur on the 
group level. 
 This provides further reason to aggregate to the group level. It appears that the 
main sources of variance operate on that level. While there are examples in this dataset 
where variables fall below the cutoff value there is not one variable which consistently 
fails to meet all of the criteria for aggregation. Taken as a whole I believe the dataset is 
appropriate for aggregation. Moving forward all analyses will occur on the group level 
(N=69). 
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RESULTS 
 
 
 Analyses will be organized by hypothesis for simplicity. On both the individual 
and group level, age, organizational tenure, and group size did not have a significant 
relationship with the study variables. For that reason I have not included them in any 
analyses as control variables. Hypothesis 1 (AAR frequency will be positively related to 
safety climate) was supported by the data. See table 4 for correlations. AAR frequency 
was positively related to safety climate (r=.28, p<.05). This finding was important for 
two major reasons. The first is that it supports the assertion that AARs have a positive 
impact on safety climate. The second is that it sets the stage for the rest of the hypotheses. 
All other hypotheses assume that AARs act as opportunities for sensemaking which in 
turn ought to positively impact safety climate. An in depth discussion of the theoretical 
impact of these (and all other) findings of this study will be presented in the discussion 
section below.  
 Hypothesis 2 (perceived supervisor trust will be positively related to safety 
climate) was also supported by the data. Perceived supervisor trust was positively related 
to safety climate (r=.67, p<.001). See table 4 for correlations. The strong statistical 
relationship is promising because perceptions of supervisor trust ought to be repaid in 
high risk contexts with a strong safety climate (Hoffman & Morgeson, 1999). This 
hypothesis along with the hypothesis 3a and 3b all support the idea that trust and safety 
climate can act as an exchange relationship as first proposed by Blau (1964). 
 Hypothesis 3a (LMX will be positively related to safety climate) was supported 
by the data. LMX was positively related to safety climate (r=.67, p<.001). See table 4 for 
correlations. This finding is essentially a replication of the work done by Hoffman and 
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others (1998; 1999). The current theory argues that in high risk contexts an exchange 
relationship exists between supervisors and their direct reports. If supervisors provide a 
high quality relationship to their direct reports then they will “repay” their supervisor 
with behaviors they assume their supervisor values. In high risk contexts these would be 
safety behaviors and the formation of strong safety attitudes. This, in turn is reflected in a 
positive relationship between LMX and safety climate. 
TABLE 4: Correlations among Study Variables 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 AAR Frequency (.80)      
2 Perceived Supervisor Trust 0.24 (.75)     
3 LMX 0.19 0.77 (.67)    
4 Behavioral Integrity 0.18 0.81 0.74 (.68)   
5 AAR Leader Behaviors 0.34 0.68 0.76 0.63 (.75)  
6 Safety Climate 0.28 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.71 (.75) 
Note. N=69. Values in parentheses are Rwg. Values greater than .27 are significant at 
p<.05. Values greater than .32 are significant at p<.001. 
 
 Hypothesis 3b (perceived supervisor trust will be positively related to safety 
climate above and beyond LMX) was also supported by the data. Testing this hypothesis 
involved a two-step regression analysis. See table 5 for beta weights, significance testing, 
and variance explained. The first step was to show the relationship between LMX and 
safety climate. The unstandardized beta weight in step 1 was .68 (p<.05). In the second 
step I included perceived supervisor trust as an additional independent variable. I was 
looking for two things. The first is a significant positive relationship between perceived 
supervisor trust and safety climate after accounting for the effect of LMX. This would 
mean perceived supervisor trust has a unique relationship to safety climate apart from 
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LMX. Further, I was looking for a reduction in the relationship between LMX and safety 
climate when accounting for the effect of perceived supervisor trust. This would suggest 
that perceived supervisor trust has an relationship to safety climate above and beyond that 
of LMX.  
 In support of hypothesis 3b both of these criteria were met. The unstandardized 
beta weight for the relationship between perceived supervisor trust and safety climate was 
.42 (p<.05). The unstandardized beta weight for the relationship between LMX and 
safety climate drops from .68 (p<.05) in step 1 to .38 (p>.05) in step 2.  Implications of 
these findings will be covered in the discussion section. 
TABLE 5: Two-Step Regression with Safety Climate as the Dependent Variable 
    b B S.E. R2 
Step 
1 
Intercept 1.04  0.37 
0.45 
LMX 0.68 0.67 0.09 
Step 
2 
Intercept 0.52  0.39 
0.50 LMX 0.38 0.37 0.14 
Perceived Supervisor Trust 0.42 0.38 0.15 
    Note. All values significant at p<.05. 
 
 Hypothesis 4a (behavioral integrity will have a positive relationship to safety 
climate) was supported by the data. Behavioral integrity was positively related to safety 
climate (r=.73, p<.001). See table 4 for correlations. This relationship helps set up 
hypothesis 4b. 
 Hypothesis 4b (supervisor trust will mediate the relationship between behavioral 
integrity and safety climate) was not supported. Steps to test for mediation provided by 
Baron & Kenny (1986) were used. The first step is to test the relationship between the 
independent variable and the mediator. In this case that is behavioral integrity and 
supervisor trust. The first half of table 6 contains all relevant statistics for this analysis. 
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Behavioral integrity is significantly related to supervisor trust (b=.75, p<.001). This 
satisfies the first step of mediation.  
 The next step is to test the relationship between behavioral integrity and safety 
climate (the independent variable and the dependent variable). Step 1 in the lower portion 
of table 6 contains this analysis. Behavioral integrity is significantly related to safety 
climate (b=.74, p<.001). This satisfies the second step of mediation. 
 The final step for mediation is to rerun the previous step and include the mediator. 
If it is a significant mediation then the independent variable will fall to non-significance 
because the mediator is accounting for all of the shared variance originally accounted for 
by the independent variable. This criterion was not met. Supervisor trust fails to reach 
significance when accounting for the relationship between behavioral integrity (b=.25, 
p>.05). Further, behavioral integrity (b=.55, p<.001) remains significant even with the 
inclusion of supervisor trust.  
 The unstandardized beta weight for behavioral integrity does drop somewhat 
suggesting that partial mediation may be occurring. However, the Sobel test was not 
significant (1.63, p=.102).  
TABLE 6: Test of Mediation of Supervisor Trust on Behavioral Integrity and Safety 
Climate 
DV: Supervisor Trust b S.E. B R2 ΔR2 
 Intercept 1.17 0.26  0.66 0.00 
Behavioral Integrity 0.75 0.07 0.81   
DV: Safety Climate b S.E.  R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 Intercept 0.87 0.33  0.53 0.00 
Behavioral Integrity 0.74 0.08 0.73   
Step 2 Intercept 0.58 0.37  0.54 0.02 
Behavioral Integrity 0.55 0.14 0.54   
Supervisor Trust 0.25 0.15 0.23     
Note. N=69 groups. * denotes p<.001. 
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 Hypothesis 5 (AAR frequency will moderate the relationship between perceived 
supervisor trust and safety climate such that higher levels of AAR frequency will 
strengthen the relationship between supervisor trust and safety climate) was not 
supported by the dataset. Table 7 contains all the relevant statistics for this analysis. 
Baron & Kenny (1986) provide steps to test for moderation that were followed for this 
analysis. The first step is to center the independent variable and the moderator to ease 
interpretation. Then, the independent variable and the moderator are included in a 
regression on the dependent variable. In this case the independent variable, supervisor 
trust (b=.70, p<.001), and the moderator, AAR frequency (b=.20, p>.05), were included. 
 The next step is to calculate the interaction term. This is done by multiplying the 
independent variable and the moderator. This interaction term is then included in the 
previous regression to see if it accounts for variance in the dependent variable above and 
beyond that of the linear variables. If it does then it means that a non-linear variable 
accounts for variance in the dependent variable and the relationship between X and Y is 
dependent on the level of the moderator. The interaction term was not significant (b=-.01, 
p>.05) and thus, hypothesis 5 was not supported by this dataset.  
TABLE 7: Test for Moderation with Safety Climate as the Dependent Variable 
Test for moderation of AAR Frequency on Supervisor Trust and Safety Climate 
DV: Safety Climate b S.E. B R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 
Intercept 3.70 0.05  0.47 0.00 
Supervisor Trust (Centered) 0.70 0.10 0.64   
AAR Frequency (Centered) 0.20 0.14 0.13   
Step 2 
Intercept 3.70 0.05  0.47 0.00 
Supervisor Trust (Centered) 0.70 0.10 0.64   
AAR Frequency (Centered) 0.20 0.15 0.13   
Interaction Term -0.01 0.31 0.00     
Note. N=69 groups. * denotes p<.001. 
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 Hypothesis 6a (supervisor AAR behaviors will have a positive relationship to 
safety climate) was supported by the dataset. This hypothesis was tested with a simple 
correlation. Table 4 contains the correlation between these two variables. Supervisor 
AAR behavior was significantly related to safety climate (r=.71, p<.001). This sets up the 
mediating relationship tested in hypothesis 6b. 
 Hypothesis 6b (perceived supervisor trust will mediate the relationship between 
good leader behaviors and safety climate) was partially supported by the data. To test for 
mediation the same steps used in hypothesis 4b and outlined by Baron & Kenny (1986) 
were used. These are to first test the relationship between the independent variable and 
the moderator (supervisor AAR behavior and supervisor trust). The second step is to test 
the relationship between the independent variable (supervisor AAR behavior) and the 
dependent variable (safety climate). Finally, the third step is to test the relationship 
between the mediator (supervisor trust) and the dependent variable above and beyond that 
of the independent variable. 
 Table 8 contains all relevant statistics for this analysis. Supervisor AAR behavior 
was significantly related to supervisor trust (b=.68, p<.001) meeting the first criteria for 
mediation. Supervisor AAR behavior was also significantly related to safety climate 
(b=.78, p<.001) meeting the second criteria for mediation. Finally, supervisor trust was 
significantly related to safety climate (b=.37, p<.05) while accounting for the relationship 
between supervisor AAR behavior and safety climate. Further, the unstandardized beta 
weight for supervisor AAR behavior drops from .78 to .53 when supervisor trust is 
included. This implies that mediation may be occurring. However, the beta does not drop 
to non-significance, suggesting a partial mediation. 
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 A Sobel test was conducted to measure the indirect effect. The Sobel test value 
was 2.90 (p<.05) which supports partial mediation. Thus, hypothesis 6b is partially 
supported. Supervisor trust partially mediates the relationship between supervisor AAR 
behavior and safety climate. 
TABLE 8: Test for Mediation with Safety Climate as the Dependent Variable 
DV: Supervisor Trust b S.E. R
2
 ΔR
2
 
 Intercept 1.43 0.35 0.46 0.00 
Supervisor AAR Behavior 0.68 0.09   
DV: Safety Climate b S.E. R
2
 ΔR
2
 
Step 1 Intercept 0.69 0.36 0.51 0.00 
Supervisor AAR Behavior 0.78 0.09   
Step 2 Intercept 0.15 0.38 0.57 0.06 
Supervisor AAR Behavior 0.53 0.12   
Supervisor Trust 0.37 0.12   
Note. N=69 groups. * denotes p<.05. ** denotes p<.001. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 This dissertation focused on after action reviews, leadership behaviors, group 
attitudes and-importantly- antecedents of safety climate on the group level. Broadly 
speaking this paper is important because safety climate has a strong, measurable, and 
immediate relationship to very real accident rates in high risk organizations (Hofmann & 
Stetzer, 1998; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Zohar, 2008). By gaining a better understanding of 
the antecedents of safety climate they can more easily be manipulated and, ultimately, 
accidents at work can be reduced. 
 In this dissertation I attempted to unravel the leader behaviors that elicit group 
member attitudes that in turn shape attitudes about the importance of safety within the 
group. Gherardi, et al. (1998) argue that culture (and by extension, climate) operates on 
the group level most strongly. It is one’s immediate peers and supervisor that truly shape 
this portion of organizational life through communicative means. Because the very 
meaning of safety and risk are being formed at this level (Simpson, 1996) safety climate 
is understandably difficult to shape and manipulate (Choudhry, et al., 2007). Thus, an 
understanding of the levers that affect safety climate truly solves a difficult and pressing 
organizational issue. 
 In regards to theory, this paper attempted to add clarity to the nomological net 
surrounding safety climate. Zohar (2008) called for research on behavioral integrity and 
its relationship to safety climate. This paper began to answer that call. Further, this paper 
identified the nuanced relationship between LMX, perceived supervisor trust, and safety 
climate. I provided evidence for the idea that perceptions of leader supportiveness (LMX) 
are subsumed by perceptions of leader trust when attempting to manipulate safety 
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climate. This confirms the work by Conchie & Donaldson (2006) and Cox, et al. (2006) 
on the importance of trust in safety perceptions.  
 I collected data from firefighters to provide support for my hypotheses because 
they work in natural groups and are truly members of a high risk organization in which 
safety and reliability are of the utmost importance. Using previously collected qualitative 
data I was able to derive a behavioral checklist of supervisor behaviors during AARs that 
now has empirical evidence linking them to safety climate. These are expert-derived best 
practices that can be shared with others to improve AAR effectiveness and safety 
attitudes.  
 Attempting to measure safety and risk in the context of one’s coworkers and 
supervisor was difficult because of the political nature of these topics in the fire service. 
Safety is seen as a luxury reserved for other jobs. Firefighting is inherently dangerous and 
many firefighters see that as a source of pride (Scott & Trethewey, 2008). Further, 
firefighters work in such tightly knit groups that agreeing to negative statements about 
other group members may have been seen as socially undesirable. For that reason one 
limitation of this study is the positive bias seen in the mean and standard deviations of the 
scales measured. If a scale was positively worded then scores tended to be significantly 
higher than the mid point of the scale. 
 The rest of this discussion section will be organized by hypothesis to aid 
understanding. Following that a section will discuss overall findings, limitations, and 
future directions for research.  
AAR Frequency and Safety Climate 
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 The first hypothesis was a replication of Allen, et al. (2010) who found a positive 
relationship between AAR frequency and safety climate. I was able to replicate these 
findings, but with a surprisingly lower correlation. In this study the correlation was .28 
(p<.05) while the Allen, et al. (2010) study found a correlation of .38 (p<.01). 
Considering that theory suggests that AARs are a venue for sensemaking (Hofmann 
&Stetzer, 1998), it seems that holding more frequent AARs ought to have a stronger 
relationship to safety climate.  
 One explanation for the surprisingly weak relationship is the role of group 
busyness. Allen, et al. (2010) found it to be a significant moderator of the relationship 
between AAR frequency and safety climate. The less busy groups had a stronger 
relationship between the focal variables. They accounted for an additional 6% of variance 
in safety climate by considering this interaction.  
 While busyness is no doubt an issue to be considered, I believe the somewhat 
weak relationship of AAR frequency to safety climate points to a more fundamental 
issue. AAR quality is much more important that AAR quantity. Frequency is a necessary 
but not sufficient antecedent of safety climate. Holding zero AARs will obviously have a 
negative relationship to safety climate. However, note that out of all the variables 
measured in this study AAR frequency had the weakest relationship to safety climate. 
The rest of the variables, especially supervisor AAR behavior, act as a proxy for AAR 
quality. Behavioral integrity and supervisor AAR behavior (r=.73 and r=.71) have 
especially strong relationships to safety climate. Both speak to the leader-specific 
influence that AAR quality can have on safety climate. Taken together, they imply that 
captains who maintain good meeting practices (supervisor AAR behaviors) and hold 
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themselves accountable to those meeting practices (behavioral integrity) will have crews 
with exceptionally strong safety climates. Holding these high quality AARs frequently 
would likely create a strong positive interaction relationship to safety climate.  
Perceived Supervisor Trust and Safety Climate 
 The second hypothesis proposed was that perceived supervisor trust would have a 
positive relationship to safety climate. This hypothesis was supported (r=.67, p<.001). 
Cox, et al. (2006) argue that a trusted supervisor in a high risk organization will be 
“repaid” with safe attitudes and behaviors. The researchers were using social exchange 
theory (Blau, 1964) as the framework for this relationship and found qualitative evidence 
to support it. The current study provides quantitative evidence. 
 More specifically, a supervisor perceived as being trustworthy will elicit more 
honest and open communication among their direct reports. This open communication is 
vitally important because safety, risk, and reliability are ongoing and communicative 
processes (Weick, et al. 1999) negotiated and renegotiated (Simpson, 1996; Scott & 
Threthewey, 2008) over time. A supervisor must foster and maintain an environment in 
which these communicative processes can occur. A supervisor can do this by reviewing 
the behaviors in the AAR leadership behavior scale and engaging in them while leading 
an AAR. For example, allowing everyone to speak, respecting the opinions of others, and 
discussing everyone’s role in the event. 
 There are a variety of explanations for the mechanism at work in this hypothesis. 
Scott, Allen, Bonilla, Baran, & Murphy (in press) argue that freedom of dissent is an 
important ingredient in successful sensemaking during AARs. Using theory provided by 
Kassing (1997) the researchers argue that having the impression that one is free to dissent 
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(not necessarily dissenting, just feeling free to do so) leads to a variety of positive 
outcomes for sensemaking. Feeling free to dissent will reduce the likelihood that group 
members will censor themselves. In a process like sensemaking where decision making 
ought to migrate towards expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) being comfortable 
dissenting (and not censoring oneself) could lead to ambiguity reduction and ultimately a 
stronger safety climate. Openness, honesty, and group interaction during AARs (a 
product of perceived supervisor trust) may lead to perceived freedom of dissent which in 
turn reduces ambiguity and improves safety climate.   
 This hypothesis is interesting because it uses Blau’s (1964) theory of social 
exchange as the mechanism that gets it started. Hofmann, et al. (1999) and Zohar & Luria 
(2005) theorize that in complex organizations supervisors must highlight the most 
important policies, procedures, and environmental cues. Simply put, supervisors must 
help direct reports make sense of the organization. In a high risk organization reliability 
and safety ought to be at the top of the supervisor’s list of important issues to highlight. 
Social exchange theory suggests that direct reports should repay their supervisor with 
what they expect, reward, and support. If these supervisors are highlighting safety then 
that is what will be perceived as what they expect, reward, and support in their direct 
reports.  
 How a direct report repays their supervisor is an interesting question as well. 
There must be some sort of contextualizing variable that gives the direct report some 
guidance on this. In this case the answer is frequent AARs. These act as the venue for 
repayment. They also act as the venue where supervisors help direct reports make sense 
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of the organization by highlighting important aspects of the environment. This 
highlighting is done by enacting the supervisor AAR behaviors measured in this study. 
 A supervisor who highlights the importance of safety via AARs and is perceived 
as trustworthy ought to drive safety climate. Indeed, this is exactly what Williams and 
Geller (2001) argue in their paper on behaviorally based safety and safety culture. 
Perceptions of trust in one’s immediate manager affecting safety climate now has 
qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting it. 
Perceived Supervisor Trust, LMX, and Safety Climate 
 Hofmann, et al. (1999) first argued that LMX would drive the exchange 
relationship being “repaid” with safe attitudes and, ultimately, safe behaviors. However, I 
proposed that it is perceived supervisor trust that truly drives this relationship and that 
supervisor supportiveness (LMX) is essentially a byproduct of this relationship. That is, a 
trustworthy supervisor will almost always be perceived as supportive, but a supportive 
supervisor may not always be seen as trustworthy. Hypothesis 3a and 3b posit that while 
LMX will surely have a strong relationship to safety climate, perceived supervisor trust 
will have a relationship above and beyond that of LMX. This is because of the important 
role trust plays in high risk organizations and their safety culture.  
 As discussed previously, group members must feel that they can be honest and 
open with their discussion of hazards, risk, and safety. While a supportive supervisor will 
have likely have an relationship to these attitudes, a trustworthy supervisor will have a 
stronger relationship. As predicted, LMX had a strong positive relationship to safety 
climate (b=.68, p<.001). However, when considering the relationship of perceived 
supervisor trust the unstandardized beta weight for LMX drops to .38 (p<.05). Further, 
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when accounting for the relationship of LMX and safety climate the beta weight for 
perceived supervisor trust (b=.42, p<.001) is strong, positive, significant, and greater than 
the unique effect of LMX on safety climate. The data provide empirical evidence 
supporting a stronger unique effect of perceived supervisor trust on safety climate than 
LMX on safety climate.  
 This does not discredit the findings of Hofmann et al. (1999). Instead it highlights 
the specific nature of the exchange relationship between supervisor and direct report in a 
high risk setting. Supervisor supportiveness (LMX) is important, but supervisor 
trustworthiness is even more so. LMX measures the broader and more general attitude of 
perceived supervisor supportiveness while perceived supervisor trustworthiness is the 
more specific attitudinal target. Because of the critical role of trust in safety climate it 
will have a stronger relationship to safety climate. 
 An alternative explanation is mediation. I tested the relationships in hypothesis 3b 
but as a mediational model where supervisor trust mediates the relationship between 
LMX and safety climate. The criteria for partial mediation were met and the Sobel test 
was significant (p<.05). Thus, it could be possible that LMX informs supervisor trust 
which in turn has an effect on safety climate. Obviously statements about causation 
cannot be made, however, it suggests avenues for future research. Perhaps perceptions of 
supervisor trustworthiness are a product of supervisor supportiveness as measured by 
LMX. 
Behavioral Integrity and Safety Climate 
 Hypothesis 4a is that behavioral integrity and safety climate will have a positive 
relationship. This hypothesis was strongly supported (r=.73, p<.001) and for good 
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reason. Kouzes & Posner (1992) argue that direct reports are more likely to trust a 
supervisor if they practice what they preach. Considering the previously established 
relationship between perceived supervisor trust and safety climate it follows that 
behavioral integrity ought to have a positive relationship to safety climate.  
 Behavioral integrity is an interesting construct in relation to safety climate 
because both focus on consistency. In safety climate we talk about consistency in the 
form of reliability. Behavioral integrity is defined as the perception of the congruence 
between words and deeds (Simons, 1999). For supervisors it is about the consistent 
application of policies and procedures. 
 Zohar (2008) recommends behavioral integrity as a focus of safety climate 
research moving forward. He argues that this construct builds trust over time which in 
turn drives safety climate. To test this relationship I proposed hypothesis 4b which posits 
a mediating relationship between perceived supervisor trust and the relationship between 
behavioral integrity and safety climate. In this case behavioral integrity would lead to 
perceptions of supervisor trust (as proposed by Simons, 1999 among others) which in 
turn would lead to safety climate (as suggested by Zohar, 2008).  
 Surprisingly, this hypothesis was not supported. In the first step behavioral 
integrity had an unstandardized beta weight of .74 (p<.001) when accounting for variance 
in safety climate. In the second step when accounting for the relationship of perceived 
supervisor trust the unstandardized beta weight for behavioral integrity drops to .55 
(p<.001). The criterion for full mediation is for this statistic to drop to non-significance 
which it fails to do. It is possible, however, for partial mediation to have occurred. So, a 
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Sobel test was conducted to test the significance of the indirect effect. The Sobel test was 
also not significant meaning that even partial mediation is not supported. 
 Considering the strong theoretical background for this hypothesis the findings are 
counterintuitive. There is strong theory and some empirical evidence for the relationship 
between behavioral integrity and perceptions of trust (Mayer, et al, 1995; Simons, 1999; 
Simons, et al, 2007). There is also strong theory supporting the relationship between 
perceptions of trust and safety climate (Collinson, 1999; Cox, et al, 2006) and 
quantitative (Conchie & Donaldson, 2006) and qualitative (Geller, 1998; DesPasquale & 
Geller, 1999) evidence in support of this relationship. Taking this into account it is 
possible that this could be a methodological or statistical power issue. These relationships 
were drawn from a sample of 69 cases. This is a relatively small number for social 
science research and for a test of mediation.  
 For exploratory purposes and to understand if this is potentially a power issue I 
reran the same mediation analysis on the individual level with non-captain firefighters. 
this left me with 206 valid cases. The similar pattern of results was found. The 
independent variable had a positive relationship to the mediator (b=.61, p<.001). When 
setting safety climate as the dependent variable the unstandardized beta weight for 
behavioral integrity dropped from .61 to .45 (p<.001 in both cases) when taking the 
effect of perceived supervisor trust into account. This rules out full mediation on the 
individual level but still leaves room for partial mediation. A Sobel test was conducted 
and found to be significant (Sobel value=2.86, p<.01) which supports partial mediation.  
 Importantly, this does not mean the original hypothesis is supported. Rather, it 
provides an avenue for future research and an explanation for why the original hypothesis 
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was not supported. If it is an issue of power (which this analysis suggests) then collecting 
more data ought to be satisfactory. Further, consider that we know these variables 
aggregate to the group level due to their rwg values and ICC(1) and ICC(2) values. With 
this in mind, the individual values and statistical coefficients ought to mirror those on the 
group level. The only real difference should be statistical power.  
Perceived Supervisor Trust, AAR Frequency, and Safety Climate 
 Hypothesis 5 was that AAR Frequency would have a moderating relationship to 
the relationship between perceived supervisor trust and safety climate. This hypothesis 
reaches again to social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) first used in hypothesis 3a and 3b. 
As described above I theorized that perceptions of supervisor trustworthiness would elicit 
an exchange relationship such that direct reports would “repay” their supervisor with safe 
attitudes and behaviors. Hofmann & Morgeson (1999) found support for this idea using 
leader supportiveness as the initiator of the exchange relationship. They argue that the 
context in which the relationship occurs drives the type of repayment. In high risk 
contexts the repayment would be safety related because that is the external context being 
highlighted by management (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
 Collinson (1999), Cox, et al, (2006), and Conchie & Donaldson (2006) all found 
support for the idea that supervisor trust (as opposed to leader supportiveness) could elicit 
this same exchange relationship in high risk contexts. In this study I found support for 
this relationship as well and even found that perceptions of supervisor trust accounts for 
variance in safety climate above and beyond that of leader supportiveness (LMX).  
 For hypothesis 5 I argued that AARs help to create a context in high risk 
organizations that safety is valued. The more frequently AARs are held the stronger the 
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relationship between perceived supervisor trust and safety climate. The AARs act as 
clues to the way a supervisor wants to be repaid for their trustworthiness. This 
hypothesis, however, was not supported. The interaction term failed to account for any 
more variance in safety climate above and beyond the main relationships of perceived 
supervisor trust and AAR frequency.  
 This could be due to a variety of issues. However, I believe it is due to the quality 
over quantity issue highlighted in the discussion of hypothesis 1 (AAR frequency being 
positively related to safety climate). Consider that the relationship between AAR 
frequency and safety climate was the weakest of the measured variables (r=.28, p<.05). I 
suggested that this was because the quality of an AAR has a stronger relationship to 
safety climate than how frequently AARs are held. To support this idea I pointed out that 
supervisor AAR behavior had a much stronger relationship to safety climate (r=.71, 
p<.001) than AAR frequency. Supervisor AAR behavior could act as a proxy to AAR 
quality (at least from the point of view of good meeting practices). Remember that this 
scale was qualitatively derived from firefighters who were asked what makes for a good 
AAR. It is an expert-derived checklist of AAR best practices in the fire service.  
 An alternative explanation is that an especially high level of trust is not necessary 
for safety climate to form. Rather, it is more important that there is simply a lack of 
distrust. That is, once a minimum level of trust has been reached more does not 
significantly improve outcomes. Firefighters form tightly knit crews early on and it is 
likely that this minimum level of trust is earned early in the formation of the group. Once 
it is set there is little question of trustworthiness amongst group members. There is 
potential for this to work similar to Herzberg’s (1959) hygiene-motivation theory. That is, 
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a lack of trust among group members will have a negative effect on important outcomes. 
However, a high level of trust does not necessarily drive outcomes.  
 Future research ought to look into the formation of crews over time and 
perceptions of trust. It is possible that early on in the group’s history trust plays a much 
more important role in safety climate. Over time that effect ought to weaken as group 
members prove that they are trustworthy. 
 Moving forward, research on the exchange relationship between perceptions of 
supervisor trust and safety climate ought to focus on how the importance of safety is 
being communicated to direct reports. The medium and content used by management to 
impress a safety message should act as a moderator on the trust to safety climate 
exchange relationship. Obviously, better messaging ought to lead to a stronger 
relationship. But what does “better” look like? 
 According to the findings of this study, “better” appears to be a function good 
meeting practices. Starting on time, allowing others to speak, respecting opinions, and 
staying on topic are all good meeting practices. They are also AAR leader behaviors that 
are related to safety climate in a positive way. This is because they help enact the 
sensemaking process during AARs.  
 Future research ought to think of sensemaking as meetings. Then the literature on 
meeting effectiveness could be tied in and used to find best practices for enacting and 
enhancing the sensemaking process. While sensemaking itself is difficult to measure, the 
outcomes of good sensemaking are easily measured. Safety climate is an outcome in a 
high risk environment. However, other more general outcomes could include learning, 
ambiguity reduction, or even improvement in group agreement. It may be more 
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interesting to focus on specific outcomes, though. Again, in the fire service that could be 
safety climate, but in the military it could easily be team effectiveness on a standardized 
training course. Any time AARs can affect a team in some way then that ought to point to 
sensemaking. 
Supervisor AAR Behavior and Safety Climate 
 The most forward looking hypotheses in this study focused on behaviors 
supervisors engage in during AARs that have a positive relationship to safety climate. 
Hypothesis 6a was that supervisor AAR behavior would have a positive relationship to 
safety climate. This hypothesis was strongly supported (r=.71, p<.001). To create this 
scale I first conducted a previous study that collected qualitative responses to the question 
“what makes for a good AAR?” The participants of this previous study were all active 
firefighters who had engaged in AARs as part of their job. Without any further prompts 
nearly all response focused on what supervisors should do during AARs to make them 
effective. Table 2 contains the themes of responses for this first study. 
 In the current study I worked with my advisor and another graduate student, both 
subject matter experts, to write items based on the themes identified from the first study. 
After many rounds of writing and reviewing we included them on the survey for this 
study. The items were all supervisor-focused good meeting practices and were expected 
to create a unidimensional factor structure. An exploratory factor analysis showed that 
the items did factor together in this manner thus making it appropriate to treat them as 
one scale.  
 Beyond the hypothesis I was also interested in the specific behaviors that drove 
safety climate most strongly. To do this I examined the correlations of each item to safety 
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climate and the unique variance (beta weights) accounted for by each item holding all 
other items constant. Nearly every item had a strong relationship to safety climate and all 
were statistically significant (p<.001). The two weakest correlations were “talks about 
what went wrong during the call” (r=.47, p<.001) and “points out funny things that 
happened during the call” (r=.45, p<.001). The former was likely and issue of item 
wording. Recall that this was the item that had the weakest factor loading as well. 
However, a similar item “discusses what we could have done better during the call” had a 
strong factor loading and a strong correlation to safety climate. This supports the idea that 
“talks about what went wrong during the call” is a poorly worded item. It includes the 
word “wrong” in the item and that could be uniquely affecting how it is interpreted. The 
latter item about humor may not have loaded well because it is not directly related to 
AAR effectiveness. It is unclear by what mechanism discussing funny incidents during a 
call would drive safety climate attitudes.  
 The strongest correlations were also the strongest unique drivers of safety climate 
(and the only three items that were significant when taking all other items into account). 
These were “provides clear direction for the meeting” (b=.18, p<.05), “starts the meeting 
promptly after the call” (b=.14, p<.05), and “points small things crew members 
experienced so that others can learn” (b=.19, p<.05). While all the items had an 
relationship to safety climate, these three seem to focus on group learning and holding a 
structured meeting. 
Supervisor AAR Behavior, Perceived Supervisor Trust, and Safety Climate 
 The final hypothesis was that perceived supervisor trust would mediate the 
relationship between supervisor AAR behavior and safety climate. This hypothesis was 
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partially supported. I argued that supervisor behaviors during AARs would build 
perceptions of trust that would in turn improve safety climate. Partial mediation was 
supported suggesting a powerful mechanism to improve perceptions of managerial trust- 
an area that Collinson (1999) and Geller (1998) argue is incredibly hard to improve upon. 
Engaging in these behaviors during AARs can act as a first step towards building trust, 
improving safety climate, and ultimately, reducing the number of accidents in the 
workplace in a high risk organization. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Taken together this paper focused on the key antecedents to safety climate in the 
context of AARs taking place in high risk organizations. There were a few themes that 
stood out. These are 1) the importance of AAR quality over AAR quantity, 2) the first 
attempts at linking behavioral integrity to safety climate, 3) the importance of perceived 
supervisor trust, and 4) the use of social exchange theory as a mechanism explaining 
attitude formation in groups. 
 AAR quality through supervisor AAR behavior and behavioral integrity was a 
valuable concept that should be explored further. It is likely that quality, however 
measured, is truly the main relationship driving safety climate in AARs. How frequently 
these high quality AARs occur should be considered a moderating variable. Future 
research would benefit from exploring ways to measure AAR quality. 
 One avenue I recommend is somehow combining supervisor behaviors with their 
perceived behavioral integrity. That is, does a supervisor hold themselves accountable to 
the good meeting practices, safety policies, and safety procedures they ask their direct 
reports to follow? If so, then their perceived behavioral integrity will be improved 
(Simons, 1999) and improvements in safety climate ought to be seen. It is likely that the 
future of research on behavioral integrity and safety climate will hinge on identifying the 
actual behaviors supervisors are engaging in. 
 Perceptions of trustworthiness will also prove to be a valuable avenue of future 
research. This study supported the work of Collinson (1999) who found qualitative 
evidence for the idea that trust perceptions were a driving force in attitudes and behaviors 
about safety. The theorized mechanism here is social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). 
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Trustworthy supervisors are “repaid” in high risk contexts with improved levels of safety 
climate. Trust, in fact, appears to be a stronger driving force than leader supportiveness as 
measured by LMX and proposed by Hofmann & Morgeson (1999).  
 Of use to practitioners this study provides specific leadership behaviors that 
supervisors can engage in during AARs. These behaviors should enhance the quality of 
AARs and the level of safety climate in the group. This increase in safety climate will 
have a real, measurable relationship to important safety outcomes like accident rates. 
Truthfully, it is for this reason that I as a researcher find this area of study so compelling. 
I am, in a small way, uncovering ways to keep people in dangerous jobs safe. While the 
relationship may be small over time it may mean the difference between someone getting 
seriously injured or not. It could even mean the difference between life and death. 
 This study is not without its limitations. Two stand out as noteworthy. The first is 
the relatively small number of cases used for the analyses. The sample size was 69 intact 
groups. This is relatively small for social science standards and pushed the limits of 
statistical power. Indeed, it appeared that hypothesis 4b failed to be supported for this 
very reason. A larger sample size, while difficult to obtain, would improve this study. 
 The second limitation is the fact that these data were collected at one time. 
Without a time 1 time 2 set up it is not appropriate to make causal statements. However, 
considering the strong theoretical backing for each hypothesis I do not believe this is as 
much of a limitation as it could be. In the case of safety climate, especially, there truly 
appears to be some causal mechanisms at play (Zohar, 2008). It is appropriate to discuss 
it as an outcome variable being affected by supervisor behaviors and direct report 
attitudes. Overall, this study has moved both theory and practice forward by identifying 
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the key antecedents, relationships, and mechanisms that drive safety climate on the group 
level in high risk environments.  
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